The role and contribution of foreign, non-state actors in domestic climate governance: An orchestration approach

Ira Shefer

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Ira Shefer

School of Governance
Technical University of Munich
Germany
Email: shefer.ira.mail@gmail.com

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to better understand engagements of non-state actors within other, foreign jurisdictions, and what these engagements bring about in terms of domestic climate governance developments and innovation. It places special attention on examining interactions that are less (or not at all) formal, structured or institutionalized. In this, the paper adds to the emerging debates regarding the orchestration framework and on-going developments in climate governance research. For that purpose, the interactions between the (German) Heinrich Böll Foundation (HBF) and Israeli state and non-state actors were examined by conducting semi-structured interviews and reviewing texts that are related to these interactions. First, the analysis lays out the involvement of the HBF in Israel. Then, this involvement is established as an orchestration process: the HBF utilizes Israeli actors to influence Israeli governance settings regarding climate change and sustainability. Next, outcomes and failures of this process are addressed. Lastly, the paper discusses these findings through the lens of the climate governance innovation framework. It suggests that orchestration has a limited influence over domestic climate governance developments and innovation in the Israeli context.

1. Introduction

Tackling climate change and global warming is one of the most pressing challenges of our time. What was previously the concern of nation states and international governmental organizations (IGOs) and global non-governmental organizations (NGOs), has turned into a concern of many other actors. Instead of hierarchic structures and top-down approaches, new forms of climate-governance are emerging: subnational and municipal actors, expert and knowledge networks and private entities, among others, have an increasingly prominent role in dealing with climate change. Now, more than ever before, we are witnessing a diversity of actors that make efforts to take part in climate governance (Andonova et al. 2009).

Within this system, one can identify governance leaders, whether at the nation-state level, the city level or among non-state actors. Germany is considered that kind of a global leader in terms of developing and implementing policies that tackle climate change, and in adopting (aspects of) sustainability within everyday social and economic practices (Hake et al. 2015). Moreover, the country's experience is not constrained to its jurisdiction alone. Rather, German state and non-state actors are heavily involved in transferring policies and practices regarding climate change and sustainability to other jurisdictions (Marquardt et al. 2016).

Israel is one of the recipients of the German experience. Israel is a developed country with high and intensive developmental patterns. These patterns put pressure on the utilization and management of natural resources while maintaining a high living standard. Moreover, the country cannot escape the effects of climate change. However, it does not provide sufficient response to these challenges, especially at the state-level (Tal 2016).

Knowledge transfer and exchange regarding climate change and sustainability with Germany entails, from both sides, central and subnational governmental actors, as well as non-state actors. Among the key actors involved in this process is the (German) Heinrich Böll Stiftung (Heinrich Boell Foundation) (HBF). The HBF is a political foundation and think tank that aims to promote and coordinate environmental and democratic/liberal values in Germany and in other countries (Heinrich Boell Foundation 2017a). While it can be defined as a non-state actor, the HBF has a strong political identity: the foundation is affiliated with the German green party, and it receives most of its funding from the German Federal Government and, partly, from the EU (with marginal amounts coming from private sources such as membership fees) (Heinrich Boell Foundation 2015, 50).

In Israel, the HBF pursues its aims and ideology by promoting gender equality, peace building and strengthening democracy; with sustainability being a core issue in its activities (Dachs, 2017). While several other foreign organizations/foundations are working in Israel to pursue their aims and ideologies, no other foreign foundation is as active and engaged in climate change and sustainability issues in Israel as the HBF (Interview 7). The HBF's representatives in Israel are regular guests and participants in climate change and sustainability-related professional and academic conferences and events, and their names can be found in projects and collaborations with Israeli and German partners.

Considering this background, it seems of great interest to understand the engagement of non-state actors such as the HBF within other jurisdictions, and what this engagement brings about -- especially regarding climate governance developments and innovation. As elaborated in Section 2, the research has so far provided only partial insights in this regard. The theoretical framework and the methods that this paper relies on are presented in Section 3. The analysis and a discussion follow, respectively, in Sections 4 and 5, with Section 6 concluding this paper and providing paths for future research.

2. Research gaps

Interactions and collaborations between a diverse set of state and non-state actors regarding climate change and sustainability are not new to climate governance scholarship (Bulkeley and Betsill 2013; Jordan and Huitema 2014; Stone 2004). The concept of orchestration (Abbott and Snidal 2009; Abbott et al. 2012, 2015a) has emerged to better understand the interactions between state and non-state actors -- in particularly IGOs. These studies have put the foundations of this framework and developed its concepts and utilization, but have continued to focus largely on international non-state actors at the international level, i.e. global governance issues. Other studies have further developed orchestration to apply it to global climate action for non-state and subnational actors and global networks (Bäckstrand et al. 2017; Chan and Pauw 2014; Gordon and Johnson 2017). These studies, however, lack aspects of more domestic, local jurisdictions.

Several authors have indeed recognized this gap. Bendlin (2017) extended orchestration to regional networks in the EU, and van der Ven et al. (2017) studied "orchestration platforms" for climate-related registries and evaluation schemes by the private sector and subnational entities. But while these studies have made important contributions to the understanding of

their respective foci and to the development of the orchestration framework itself, insufficient knowledge remains regarding orchestrated interactions that exceed established, structured settings, especially those which occur at the local/subnational level and engage actors from countries that are not at the forefront of climate change mitigation and adaptation. Furthermore, it seems that to date, orchestration has hardly been utilized to address climate governance innovation.

Lastly, extensive research has addressed the role of German think tanks in domestic and foreign jurisdictions (e.g. Thunert 2000), but the engagements of these actors in climate governance, and the work of the HBF in that field is under-researched. This is intriguing considering the extensive efforts Germany and the HBF put into tackling climate change domestically and worldwide.

In short, to this end the research has demonstrated limited understanding regarding interactions/collaborations between foreign non-state actors and domestic state/non-state actors in an unstructured manner, and with a focus on domestic, rather than global, developments in climate governance innovations. This paper attempts to fill (some of) this gap, and in that aims to contribute to debates on the orchestration framework and its applications, and to the broader contexts of transnational and polycentric climate governance.

3. Theoretical framework

The following section presents key aspects of the orchestration framework that will be applied to the analysis in the following section, as well as a short description of the methods that were used in this paper.

3.1 Orchestration: Background

Orchestration is the process by which one actor (a governor/orchestrator) uses a third party (intermediary) to achieve certain goals and aims that cannot be reached directly (Abbott et al. 2015a). The key to orchestration is that the orchestrator works through the intermediary to govern a third actor (the target) (Abbott et al. 2012). This process is known as the O-I-T model (Figure 1):

$$\text{Orchestrator} \rightarrow \text{Intermediary} \rightarrow \text{Target}$$

Figure 1: The Orchestrator-Intermediary-Target (O-I-T) model. (Source: Abbott et al. 2012, 2).

This model can be utilized when trying to understand interactions between certain actors which try to achieve certain goals and influence other actors, when the existing or "official" situation restricts them from promoting a direct influence.

3.2 "Roles" in the O-I-T model: Orchestrator, intermediary and target(s)

What makes an actor an *orchestrator* is its will to reach certain goals by influencing other actors through a third party (intermediary) because it lacks something that the intermediary possesses: these are fulfilling governance functions, gaining expertise, setting an agenda, enhancing their (policy) credibility in a certain domain/jurisdiction, improving access to- and gaining legitimacy from/in- the jurisdiction (i.e. access to targets and their jurisdiction), and in some cases enhancing their monitoring and adjudication (Abbott et al. 2015b; Abbott et al. 2012). Put differently, orchestrators act when they lack, among others, resources, access, authority and legitimacy in a specific jurisdiction (from which they wish to achieve something).

Early studies of orchestration attributed the governor's role to states and international organizations (Abbott et al. 2012). However, this role has been stretched to subnational actors and other public organizations, think tanks, expert networks and private entities (Chan and Pauw 2014). Gordon and Johnson proposed that 'orchestrators can emerge endogenously within transnational governance initiatives, or from the broader firmament of non-nation state actors engaged in the process' (2017, 701).

The *intermediary* role can be held by both state and non-state actors, including IGOs, NGOs, businesses and trans-governmental networks. van der Ven et al. extended intermediary to be a "platform", i.e. the 'purposive efforts by international organizations (IOs) and other transnational actors to coordinate, mobilize, and value the contributions of private, hybrid, and subnational actors, in effect enlisting them as intermediaries to achieve defined regulatory goals' (2017, 2). Unlike governors, intermediaries possess the capabilities which the former lack: expertise, resources (e.g. data), legitimacy and (potentially) direct access to targets. Intermediaries act voluntarily with the governors; they collaborate because they

expect certain support and gains from fulfilling their role and they have goals that correlate with those of the governor (the orchestrator) (Abbott et al. 2012).

The targets are commonly identified as state actors or private entities (Abbott et al. 2012). However, recent studies have extended this view to collectives of actors and their settings (Bendlin 2017; Gordon and Johnson 2017).

3.3 The orchestration process

Key characteristics of orchestration are as follows (Abbott et al. 2012, 2015b): 1) a correlation between the orchestrator's and the intermediary's governance goals; 2) co-dependency between the orchestrator and the intermediary; 3) voluntary "mobilization" of the intermediary to pursue the goals; 4) orchestration is a soft and indirect mode of governance, as it rejects authoritative governing approaches. These characteristics reflect Gordon and Johnson's (2017) conditional terms for the orchestration relationship: 1) the orchestrator seeks to influence the behavior of a target via an intermediary; 2) the orchestrator does not control the intermediary; 3) the intermediary does not control and cannot compel the target.

In addition, Abbott et al. (2012) hypothesize the following regarding orchestration processes: 1) actors are more likely to orchestrate when they lack certain capabilities that are necessary to achieve their goals: weak or missing authority/regulatory competence, sufficient resources and legitimacy, as well as access in a certain domain (jurisdiction). 2) actors are more likely to orchestrate when intermediaries with shared goals and desired capabilities are available. In this, the governors cover for capabilities they lack. Availability can be actual or potential, and governors may act to acquire or modify intermediaries with the desired capabilities. Moreover, if more intermediaries are available, the orchestrator's position is stronger and orchestration seems more attractive. 3) actors are more likely to orchestrate when they are (considered to be) leaders in a relevant issue area. The more focal the actor, the easier it will be to enlist intermediaries and receive their cooperation. Moreover, focality may strengthen the O-I roles, meaning that the relationship enhances each side's roles. 4) actors are more likely to engage in orchestration in organizations that encourage policy entrepreneurship.

3.4 What is being orchestrated?

Governors strive for, and promote, the following measures to reach their governance goals (drawn from Abbott et al. 2012, 9-11): they 1) convene and steer actors, i.e. they try to

influence which actors the intermediaries meet and the substance of those meetings. 2) set the agenda by providing intermediaries with normative/cognitive guidance (i.e. influencing the latter's priorities), legitimacy and a reference point. 3) Material support (e.g. finance, access and social authority). 4) Endorsement (governors are perceived as competent and legitimate actors in a certain field, and they can therefore provide normative and political support for intermediaries to reach goals). 5) Coordination: increase impacts of intermediaries by synchronizing their activities (which can sometimes lead to improving their efficiency).

3.5 Research methods

Examining the collaborations between the HBF and Israeli actors emerged from a larger, on-going research on German-Israeli environmental cooperation and its implications for climate governance (in Israel and, partly, in Germany). The central role the HBF plays in Israel was made clear after preliminary interviews in November 2015 and internet research thereafter. More focused, in-depth interviews took place between October and November 2016 and in the first half of 2017. These interviews were coupled with internet research between December 2016 and summer 2017. This period led to the development of this paper's aims and theoretical inquiry.

Interviews in this paper were taken from a larger pool of interviewees who participated as part of the research project on German-Israeli environmental governance that was mentioned above. Interviewees were from the public and private sectors, NGOs and academia. They were selected using Internet searches and recommendations from other interviewees. Interviewees were Germans and Israelis who engaged in the cooperation between the countries and that had direct or indirect involvement of the HBF. Interviewees received guiding questions tailored to their position before the interview. Interviews were either in-person or by phone. All the interviews used for this paper were recorded. Drawing on Charmaz (2006), the data from interviews was coded manually during the interviews and during the transcription process, and then cross-referenced with other data from interviews and internet research.

4. Analysis

The analysis draws on key elements that were detailed in the previous section. Firstly, the main activities of the HBF in Israel are elaborated. Secondly, the paper examines the roles of

the O-I-T model in the HBF-Israeli context. Then, outcomes of this process are revealed as well as failures and weak-points.

4.1 The HBF in Israel

The HBF works in Israel in several ways, which are parallel but, occasionally, merge.

Organizing and supporting learning: the HBF provides, as the main or joint organizer, various learning opportunities for Israeli actors, in Israel and in Germany. Learning is not limited in scale and participation. Rather, it entails multiple actors from different governance levels and professions; in many cases they have prominent roles within Israeli decision-making circles. From 2013 to 2015, at least four tours to Germany were launched by - or with the assistance of - the HBF. These tours were organized with the sole purpose of learning from the German experience and drawing from it in the Israeli context. These tours addressed diverse topics ranging from energy to multi-sector partnerships (Interview 4).

One participant from the Israeli Green Building Council (the ILGBC; an NGO that aims to promote green building and sustainable planning in Israel[1]), describes their impressions:

> 'with the HBF I participated in a tour to Berlin on energy efficiency, green building and renewable energies. We met government officials from Berlin that deal with these issues. It made a meaningful impact on our understanding (of things). And then we became close with the HBF representative in Israel, which (now) supports several of our projects' (Interview 2).

This interviewee added that the tours and learning excursions inspired the ILGBC and provided a perspective on how sustainability is done in practice.

Not only non-state actors but also governmental actors, and especially municipalities' representatives, participated in these tours. One example was HBF support for mutual learning of - and experimentation in - green preservation efforts in Tel Aviv-Yafo (Israel), where a large number of old Bauhaus buildings are designated for preservation. This event bolstered green preservation in the Israeli context (Interview 8). Since then, Tel Aviv-Yafo

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[1] Disclosure: in 2017 the author was involved in a research project for the ILGBC.

and Berlin have been strengthening their ties regarding green preservation and other sustainability-related issues such as energy efficiency. Notably, the HBF sometimes collaborates with the German Federal Government, German research institutes and other state and non-state actors to advance this kind of learning (The Federal Government 2016; Network White City of Tel Aviv 2017).

Producing ("new") knowledge and providing a knowledge base: The HBF supports research on existing areas of interest -- as well as developing and introducing new ones to the Israeli context -- regarding climate change and sustainability. These research projects and their outputs are drawn from local and German experiences alike. They are available freely to the public and are spread to a diverse range of stakeholders.

The tool kit for enhancing multi-sector partnerships (Lebovitz 2017) is one such project. Developed by the Israeli Heschel Sustainability Centre (HSC; a non-profit organization [NPO] which focuses on embedding sustainability at the grassroots/local levels), this research examined collaborations between the public, private and civil society; and was aimed mainly at the local/municipal level. It was based on existing models and examples from Germany and Israel, and included "field research" (by Israelis) in Germany. The HBF provided it with organizational, financial and conceptual support.

Similarly, in 2016, the HBF initiated a project to give life to the Israeli climate movement and to anchor this concern in the public sphere. This is a long-term project which targets decision-makers from the central level, municipalities (mayors and municipal officials under whose mandate is the subject of sustainability), NGOs and other stakeholders (Interview 4).

Providing financial and institutional support: the HBF provides various kinds of support for Israeli actors, with the local level a major addressee. One kind of support was assistance in promoting a green agenda in municipal elections in peripheral, low income municipalities, with empowerment activities for women (Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung 2011). This kind of agenda at the Israeli periphery is considered novel. This project was made in collaboration with a Jewish-Arab NGO and, thus, fulfilled a triple aim in terms of the HBF: promoting sustainability, supporting peacebuilding organization(s) and contributing to gender equality. Another pioneer activity was supporting the initiation of greenhouse gas (GHG) surveys in minorities' peripheral municipalities (Interview 7).

Support is provided also in the form of assembling Israeli NGOs and other stakeholders together. The HBF office hosts and congregates NGOs and organizations working on advocacy, education, training, development and legislation 'in their efforts to promote social change' in Israel (Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung 2011).

Reflecting on their own activity, the president of the HBF stressed this support regarding Israel: 'Especially from the ecological point of view, we are a sort of rallying point for the Israeli environmental movement' (Dachs 2017).

Organizing and participating in events and conferences: the HBF is a prominent actor in various sustainability and climate change events in Israel, and their representatives can often be seen at these events. In some of these events the HBF is the main or one of the sponsors. Moreover, the former president of the HBF, Ralf Füchs, was a regular keynote speaker at professional and academic events in Israel (Eilat-Eilot 2016; The Heinrich Boell Foundation 2017b). Several interviewees reaffirmed that the think tank was a regular actor in events related to their expertise (e.g. interviews 3 and 5).

In short, the HBF serves as a major link to acquiring and developing new knowledge and translating/adapting this knowledge to the local Israeli context. The HBF provides institutional, material and normative support for this knowledge to be implemented, while it assembles and coordinates domestic actors. These actions are aimed mainly, but not only, at the local level. In that, the HBF advances certain agendas, ideas, policies and practices concerning climate change and sustainability to Israeli decision-making circles.

4.2 Application of the O-I-T model to the HBF-Israeli case

The HBF as an orchestrator: the HBF aims to change the ways Israeli decision-makers address climate change and sustainability. It tries to set a certain agenda, and to steer actors towards this agenda. The HBF provides material and ideational support for domestic stakeholders, and it is occupied with coordinating, supporting and developing knowledge, as well as assembling actors together to address this knowledge.

However, as a non-state actor from a foreign jurisdiction, the HBF has limited legal and political authority, as well as limited legitimacy, that other, Israeli actors may have. It lacks access to certain domains and resources to fulfil its goals in Israel. In other words, the HBF lacks direct governing capacity. Therefore, it needs domestic third parties to get itself through

the Israeli system; i.e., it needs to steer others to reach its goals. Moreover, compared to other non-state actors and its Israeli partners concerning sustainability and climate change, the HBF is a leader in terms of knowledge, expertise, experience, contacts (networks) and ideology.

The intermediaries: intermediaries are from different governance levels and jurisdictions (Israeli NGOs, civil society actors and the academia, among others). The HBF works with those organizations that have influence or are thought to have influence on municipalities, governmental ministries and public opinion. This is the case, for instance, with Tel Aviv-Yafo, one of Israel's leading municipalities regarding sustainability: The HBF works with the HSC, the ILGBC and the Israeli Energy Forum that, in turn, collaborate and work tightly with that municipality; rather than having direct contacts with the municipality itself (Interview 4).

Second, and perhaps less predicted (cf. Abbott et al. 2012), is the work of the HBF with governmental actors (see below) as intermediaries, for the purpose of reaching other goals related to governing patterns and arrangements. The HBF's work with (central level) ministries depends on their connections with - and the attentiveness of - the relevant ministry. In this regard, the (Israeli) Ministry of Environmental Protection (MoEP) is considered more responsive than other ministries. It appears, though, that in municipalities there is more responsiveness. This may well be because almost every municipality has an environmental manager (i.e. access is easier), and sustainability projects are perceived by some as beneficial for their municipality (i.e. gains). This duality is reflected in an HBF official's words: 'I think it is most effective [for us] to work with several sectors and stakeholders at the same time' (Interview 4).

What is common to all intermediaries is their shared goals with those of the HBF regarding diverting Israel towards more sustainable socio-economic patterns. Next, they cannot be governed directly, or hierarchically, by the HBF. It seems that their collaboration is voluntary and with no judicial and/or normative obligation. Moreover, domestic intermediaries have capabilities in terms of legitimacy, legal basis, authority and access that cover for what the HBF is short of. Furthermore, it may well be that they collaborate with the HBF because of its leading role and the lack of other competitors to "suggest" similar relationships.

In exchange for their role, intermediaries receive material and ideational support, new knowledge and expertise, and enhancement of their position in domestic settings:

'…things that are at their outset and no one else understand they are important, almost always the HBF will be the first to commit to... [financial support] is not high, but many times once you have something to begin with… it is easier to initiate it and find matching finance' (Interview 7).

This interviewee continued:

'The HBF gives hooks (and not fish), they have patience that is very rare (compared to other foundations); and they are partners, which is even more rare. In the preparations for the tour to Germany in 2015 (regarding multi-sector partnerships), their staff member was very involved… I have not seen that kind of involvement in other foundations' (Interview 7).

This interviewee did stress that they do not know whether this attitude characterizes the HBF as an organization or rather it was this specific person who was willing to commit as much.

The targets: the HBF seems to aim at reaching two types of targets. As implied earlier in this subsection, one type is what the "classic" model of orchestration refers to: state (local and central levels) and non-state actors (Abbott et al. 2012, 2015b). Working to change their policies and have impact on the actors themselves is what the HBF aims for. The second type is more ambiguous. Rather than a concrete actor, it seems that the HBF aims to influence governance "arrangements" and "sites" where actors interact and negotiate and, as a result, policies are formed. This type reflects on what Gordon and Johnson (2017, 701) coined as the 'heterodox collection of actors'.

4.3 Outcomes of the HBF's activities in Israel

The interaction between the HBF and intermediaries leads to several outcomes, that are directly and indirectly linked to targets.

First are the research projects, publications and reports that are generated by Israeli stakeholders and supported by the HBF. They are circulated to wide audiences and are used in academic, professional and governmental/ministerial meetings and discussions (Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung 2011). These products may attain the HBF access to decision-making circles in Israel.

Concrete outcomes can be identified as well. New projects and policies are developed, relating directly and indirectly to the HBF. These projects range from urban sustainability to energy to enhancing participation. In El'ad, a small, low-income municipality that participated in a tour to Germany in 2015, a novel change occurred in terms of 1) changes in waste management system; 2) shifting to a participatory, rather than strict, regulatory approach to engaging businesses in waste disposal practices; and 3) empowering and improving the position of the environmental department within the municipal hierarchy (Interview 7).

In Tel Aviv-Yafo, an even bigger change had occurred when (climate) adaptation policies and practices received greater attention after the official who was responsible for sustainable planning participated in a conference on urban resilience in Bonn (Germany) in 2013 (Interview 1). Although this outcome cannot be attributed to the HBF alone, the latter facilitated and coordinated the participation of Israeli stakeholders; thus, made an indirect, yet vital, contribution. In the words of one participant:

> 'In Bonn I came to realize, sincerely, the need to address three main issues [in the city]: food, waste water management [in a resilience context] and energy. Food is not under my mandate but [I can say that] waste water was promoted and now is being implemented, and the energy [policy] is in advanced stage of implementation' (Interview 1).

This person participated in another tour organized and supported by the HBF in 2014 to Berlin, where '…what was really new to me was the issue of innovation districts' (i.e. the research and development industrial park in Adlershof, Berlin) (see also Tel Aviv-Yafo 2016).

Similarly, an NGO representative who was involved in a learning mission to Germany in 2015 commented that, in their eyes, the tour made an impact in terms of advancing a more sustainable approach to transportation in Tel Aviv-Yafo. While admitting a direct line between the visit and the new approach cannot be drawn, this interviewee explained that the beginning of a change can be seen after that visit (Interview 7).

In short, it seems that the outcomes from the involvement of the HBF in Israel can be characterized mainly as the introduction of new paths for sustainability, exposing local stakeholders to new opportunities and providing tools to handle them. Several changes in

policies are also visible. However, it is still questionable whether large scale changes, and in higher governance levels, can be attributed to the HBF as well.

4.4 Failures and weak points in the O-I-T model in the HBF-Israeli case

Orchestration processes are not without flaws, and they often face barriers. Abbott et al. (2015b, 4-5) identify key factors that can interfere with orchestration, and these factors focus mainly on the orchestrator and the intermediary's roles and the missing parts in the interdependence relationships. One type of interference may occur if the intermediaries are unconvinced by the orchestrator's actions, or if they depart from the orchestrator's goals. The latter's goals, therefore, cannot be reached. Second, the capabilities of the intermediary to perform their tasks may determine the success and effectiveness of the orchestration process. If intermediaries do not have what they need to reach the goals, the orchestrator may need to empower them to reach its goals (i.e. put in additional efforts and resources).

The analysis in this paper asks to emphasize the domestic environment and internal politics of the targets as a potential barrier for orchestration processes. The central government in Israel holds most of the legislative and executive powers, and municipalities and other potential intermediaries are (considered) highly dependent on the central level in their ability to perform and develop their own policies. While this reality is showing signs of change, intermediaries may be "forced" to lose interest in the HBF's goals if the central level restrains or obliges them to divert resources to issues that are different from those under the concern of the HBF.

A concrete example of failed attempts to promote a certain agenda to wider decision-making circles in Israel was the HBF's efforts to promote a concept and a way of thinking that were new to the Israeli partners: green (sustainable) economy. In the early 2010s, the HBF had initiated a project on this topic with the MoEP and other, non-state partners. This was a 'discourse that was [common] in Germany… and [which] the ministry thought to adopt' as part of the Israeli governmental efforts to adjust to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) green growth strategy[2] (Interview 6). For that purpose, extensive research on the topic was carried out (see Brener et al. 2013), a conference was organized in Israel and a delegation was sent to Germany to learn about the latter's

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[2] Israel joined the OECD in 2010.

approach to green economy. However, 'at the end I do not think it had a practical influence on policy making, because the discourse on green growth and green economy did not have any real impact on decision makers' (Interview 6)[3].

4.5 The O-I-T model in the context of German-Israeli relations

The HBF has 30 offices around the world, but its work in Israel carries a unique aspect: the special relationship between Germany and Israel. As a result of, and despite of, the Holocaust, the two countries have been strong allies for more than 50 years. Germany provides almost unconditional support for Israel in international forums, and the economic, military and social collaborations between the countries are tight (Hadas-Handels 2015; cf. Pallade 2005). All interviewees stated that this background may assist the enabling of collaborations between the countries but may have limited implications regarding the content and conduct of these collaborations, as well as their outcomes. Reflecting on these insights, and with no (visible) contradicting data, the special relationship between the countries does not seem to have a great impact on orchestration process. However, this finding requires confirming evidence through further research.

5. Discussion

Several considerations emerge from the analysis. First, the O-I-T model can be applied when foreign, non-state actors engage in sustainability-oriented and climate policy making in domestic jurisdictions, and not only in networks and other structured/institutionalized constellations. The HBF tries to reach decision makers through local intermediaries and have an impact not only on the actors but also on the environment (or "governance site") in which they work and interact. While this view exceeds initial concepts of orchestration, it correlates with recent findings in this field. This process yields outcomes, both ideational and practical. However, to what extent can this process be linked to climate (governance) innovation?

Drawing from Jordan and Huitema (2014), there are three factors that present innovation: novelty, diffusion of this novelty and its effectiveness. The invention of new policies (or their

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[3] This interviewee claimed that a similar attempt to introduce green economy concepts to Israeli decision-making circles (see Natanzon and Weisman 2013) by the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation had no meaningful success either.

elements) – or their appearance as new – is made through policy entrepreneurs, businesses and/or leading states. The analysis suggests that non-state actors can also be marked as such. The HBF introduced various concepts and approaches that were new to Israel, and thus is somewhat of an entrepreneur. The HBF appears to be at the forefront of climate invention in the sense of directing and introducing novelty to Israeli audience.

Next is the diffusion (or transfer or lesson drawing) and adaptation of this innovation to local circumstances. Core activities of the HBF are the introduction of ideas and concepts to a wide audience as possible. The HBF does so with no discrimination of the type of actors and jurisdictions.

For the last aspect, effectiveness, innovation is impactful when it has significance in the domain in which it was adopted, it is long lasting, the audience is relevant for the policy and that it was adopted at an appropriate time (complied with existing needs and settings). The HBF-Israeli interaction is, however, ambiguous in this regard. On the one hand, some stakeholders (targets) did manage to produce outcomes and the HBF managed to introduce novel ideas and approaches to Israeli governance levels. On the other hand, the Israeli climate policies at central and local levels did not seem to change significantly because of the HBF's engagement and activities. Moreover, the positions and power of actors within the (climate) governance "scene" did not seem to change significantly because the intervention of the HBF. Put differently, this process has an impact on stakeholders; but whether this process was the main driver for policy and governance developments cannot be clearly established at this stage of research.

This insight may be in conflict with the claim of Abbott et al. (2015b, 9) that 'whatever its flaws… the correct counterfactual for assessing orchestration is the absence of governance. Where that is the standard, even fairly ineffective orchestration may still be the most effective governance mode available'. While the Israeli climate change and sustainability governance has policy gaps, the HBF's engagement was not necessarily effective in filling them sufficiently.

Moreover, innovation in this regard seems to be focused at the local level; and this focus deserves special attention. The Israeli political system is centralized, but nevertheless local-central relations are "fuzzy" (Dery 2002), i.e. control over a policy issue depends on the context. In addition, there is an increasing participation and influence of Environmental

NGOs (ENGOs) and other non-state actors on decision making processes at the local Israeli level (Rosen and Razin 2009).

Taking these elements together raises questions of legitimacy. Abbott et al. (2015b) claimed that orchestration may have elements of "bypassing" the state's institutions and authority, and electoral accountability, because it embeds gaining influence over decision-makers by organizations that were not elected and are not in the public eye. Moreover, intermediaries may increase their exercise of authority in an external unaccountable and uncontrollable way which, potentially, provides them and their orchestrators ways to exceed their mandate. The HBF works to influence the local level but also works with the local level itself. Thus, its enrichment of intermediaries implies bypassing the state to a certain extent; or, at least, having a potential to do so. However, this potential seems to be still at a small scale and with little (visible) impact.

Notably, the legitimacy of the HBF's work in Israel was challenged by far-right/conservative Israeli organizations. The think tank was criticized for allegedly hiding its support for left-wing Israeli NGOs, for being biased towards the political left in Israel and for intervening in domestic politics (NGO MONITOR 2017).

6. Conclusions

Reflecting on the HBF-Israeli interactions, the following can be concluded. First, the O-I-T model may be extended to 1) interactions and cooperation between non-state foreign actors and their partners, that are in 2) other jurisdictions and from different governance scales, regarding 3) climate change and sustainability, when 4) the setting is unstructured and lacks a (formal) institutional basis. This adds to other studies of cooperation that focused on more structured forms of collaborations such as state and IGOs interactions and networks. Moreover, the orchestration process in this kind of constellation may address targets that are not only governance actors but also the "collective site" where interactions and coordination occur, i.e. targeting the way actors collaborate, what topics they negotiate on, and how those negotiations take place.

Second, orchestration may contribute to climate (governance) innovation, but in a restricted way: orchestration is limited to small-scale, local level initiatives while facing hardships when governors try to gain influence over central-level and national targets. Moreover, innovation in this sense seems to refer more to introducing, producing and spreading new

knowledge with less focus on practical measures or on-site experimentation. Orchestration may assist enabling innovation, but it is questionable whether it is the sole or main contributor for it.

These two insights lead to a third conclusion: the process of orchestration has had a limited, at least in this stage, contribution to changes in Israeli climate governance. The orchestration process benefits domestic Israeli intermediaries but does not seem to undermine their powers and positions. On the other hand, one must consider that the fact that the HBF participates in domestic governance and maintains certain powers in this context may, by itself, present a change regarding who participates, how and what are the outcomes of that. While modest at present, orchestrated interactions with the local level may, in the long run, lead to more profound changes in the Israeli climate governance.

Reflecting on what Bendlin (2017) coined as orchestration, the HBF may certainly be able to assemble actors together and get them to play a certain tune. Not undermining the efforts to conduct a concert of that sort, the performance itself still needs tuning. Put differently, the HBF can organize and orchestrate a concert, but it does not necessarily lead to the best performance.

Lastly, this study has left several issues open for future research:

1. More empirical research is needed to deepen and test the claims that were raised in this paper, in both centralized and decentralized political systems.

2. Especially, more examination is needed regarding effectiveness and, therefore, the actual and potential impacts on developing innovative climate governance in these kinds of interactions/constellations.

3. There is much potential in examining the "reverse" relationships in orchestration in these instances, i.e. whether targets or intermediaries aim to reach their goals by orchestrating the orchestrators (e.g. Israeli governmental actors use domestic NGOs to influence the HBF and other German actors).

4. Likewise, more research is needed regarding a) the possibility that the HBF is an intermediary being mobilized by the German Federal Government (or other actors) to reach the latter's goals in foreign jurisdictions, and the implications such a process

has on climate governance; and b) the possibility of the HBF mobilizing German intermediaries to reach its goals in foreign jurisdictions (e.g. in Israel).

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List of interviewees

1. Director, Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality, Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel. Personal interview, March 2017.
2. CEO, the Israeli Green Building Council, Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel. Personal interview, November 2016.
3. Staff, Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality, Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel, Personal interview, November 2016.
4. Staff member, the Heinrich Böll Foundation, Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel. Phone interview, November 2016.
5. Staff, Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality, Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel, Personal interview, November 2016. Director, the Ministry of Environmental Protection, Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel. Personal interview, November 2016.
6. Staff member, Heschel Sustainability Center, Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel. Personal interview, November 2016.
7. Director, Tel Aviv-Yafo Municipality, Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel. Personal interview, November 2011